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CIVIL CYBERCONFLICT: MICROSOFT,
CYBERCRIME, AND BOTNETS
Janine S. Hiller†
Cyber “warfare” and hackback by private companies is a hot
discussion topic for its potential to fight cybercrime and promote
cybersecurity. In the shadow of this provocative discussion, Microsoft
has led a concerted, sustained fight against cybercriminals by using
traditional legal theories and court actions to dismantle criminal
networks known as botnets. This article brings focus to the role of the
private sector in cybersecurity in light of the aggressive civil actions
by Microsoft to address a thorny and seemingly intractable global
problem. A botnet is a network of computers infected with unauthorized
code that is controlled from a distance by malicious actors. The extent
of botnet activity is staggering, and botnets have been called the plague
of the Internet. The general public is more commonly aware of the
damaging results of botnet activity rather than its operation, intrusion,
or infection capabilities. Botnet activity may result in a website being
unavailable due to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, identity theft can
occur because the botnet collects passwords from individual users, and
bank accounts may be emptied related to botnet activity. Spam, fraud,
spyware, and data breaches are all the result of botnet activity.
Technical remedies for stopping botnet attacks and damages are
ongoing, but technical solutions alone are inadequate. Law
enforcement is active in tracking down criminal activities of botnets,
yet the number and sophistication of the attackers overwhelm it. In a
new development, multiple civil lawsuits by Microsoft have created the
legal precedent for suing botnet operators and using existing law to
dismantle botnets and decrease their global reach. This article reviews
the threats created by botnets and describes the evolution of legal and
technical strategies to address botnet proliferation. The distinctive
aspects of each of the cases brought by Microsoft are described and
analyzed and the complex questions surrounding a botnet takedown

† Janine S. Hiller is a Professor of Business Law, and the Richard E. Sorensen Professor
in Finance, at Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Va. (jhiller@vt.edu).
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are identified. Discussion of the details of the lawsuits are important,
because over a relatively short period of time, government and private
sector roles have evolved considerably in the search for a methodology
to deal effectively with botnets. Theoretical and international questions
surrounding the sustainability and policy ramifications of private
sector leadership in cybersecurity are examined, and questions for
future research are identified.
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INTRODUCTION
Headlines of cyberattacks, data breaches, identity theft, spam, and
social engineering draw public attention and outrage. Cyber “warfare”
and hackback by private companies is a hot discussion topic for its
potential to fight cybercrime and promote cybersecurity.1 In the
shadow of this provocative discussion, Microsoft has led a concerted,
sustained fight against cybercriminals by using traditional legal
theories and court actions to dismantle criminal networks known as
botnets. This article brings focus to the role of the private sector in
cybersecurity in light of the aggressive civil actions by Microsoft to
address a thorny and seemingly intractable global problem.
The method for delivering cyberattacks damages is commonly by
means of large numbers of “zombie” computers infected with malware.
Criminals and hacktivists surreptitiously and without authorization
install software on individual computers, allowing them to control and
use the multitude of computers to accomplish illicit purposes. The
group of computers controlled can number into the hundreds of
thousands, and even millions. With these large numbers, a criminal is
able to wield increased power and extend his reach around the globe.
The group of connected, controlled computers just described is called
a botnet. Botnets are the “plague of the Internet.”2
Effective disarmament of growing numbers of global botnets is a
difficult challenge; while technical solutions are developed to disrupt
and disable them, the malicious controller responds with new tactics
and increasingly sophisticated software. At the same time, the
increasingly significant harm caused by these networks of “hijacked”
computers, fueling cybercrime across the globe, makes it exponentially
more important to control their spread. In addition, because botnets
operate across national boundaries, disabling them can involve national
and international legal and policy questions. As countries try to protect
their citizens from malware that knows no physical boundaries, it is
possible that the failure to control the growth and harmful effects of
botnets could have such far-reaching effect as to create barriers within
1. See Jan E. Messerschmidt, Hackback: Permitting Retaliatory Hacking by Non-State
Actors as Proportionate Countermeasures to Transboundary Cyberharm, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2013) (discussing the debate and theory of hackback). For a cyberwar
perspective discussing the relationship between military and private actors in cyberspace, and
potential limitations, see Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third
Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203 (2013).
2. A phrase used in many of the Microsoft civil suit court documents.
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the fundamental Internet infrastructure and walled segments for
protection.3 However, preventing the spread of illegal botnet activity is
not only a public safety issue for law enforcement; private parties and
businesses have been active in the remediation of malicious software.
Thus, the questions surrounding a botnet takedown are complex.
Over a relatively short period, government and private sector roles have
evolved considerably in the search for a methodology to deal
effectively with botnets. In order to understand the evolution, this
article first provides a brief technical description of botnet operations
and an explanation of why employing purely technical means have
proven insufficient to handle the threat. Earlier voluntary efforts of
loosely networked entities are explained and their limitations
examined. Many private entities deserve recognition and credit for their
fight against botnets. The limited focus of this article, however, is
Microsoft’s lead role in pursuing private civil action to thwart and
disable botnets. The private, civil action legal approach to dismantling
botnets is chronicled, highlighting the evolution of increasingly
aggressive tactics and the involvement of law enforcement. A record
of Microsoft’s legal strategies is important to memorialize the
precedent that was set by their aggressive legal actions to fight these
cyberthreats, as this model could be adopted by other businesses. Wider
adoption of Microsoft’s legal approach to dismantle botnets needs
further study. The article proposes four lenses for this future work:
“crimtort,” governance, strategic management, and international
perspectives. At present, Microsoft, its partners, law enforcement, and
international stakeholders express the willingness to collaborate;
private sector leadership may prove to be the necessary ingredient for
a sustained and successful fight against technically advanced and
globally dispersed cybercrime.
I.

BOTNETS AND TAKEDOWN APPROACHES

A basic understanding of how botnets are structured and
controlled is necessary to appreciate why technical means alone are
insufficient to destroy them. The difficulty of using technical means to
defeat botnets is equaled by the challenges of assembling the
appropriate persons or entities to disrupt them. While it may be counter
intuitive law enforcement did not take the early lead in disrupting
criminal botnets. Instead, a voluntary coalition of various private
3. See Andrea Renda, Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. (May 3, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-internet-governance
/p30621.
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parties and an international corporation mounted a collaborative effort
that produced positive results. When law enforcement in the United
States did take aggressive action to remediate botnet activity, some
criticism about their tactics emerged.4 A brief technical background of
botnets and a review of the collaborative and law enforcement efforts
to rid the Internet of these threats provide an important backdrop to
understanding Microsoft’s legal tactics to reach similar results by
different means.
A. Definitions and Threats
A bot is defined as a software “program [installed on a computer]
that performs user centric tasks automatically without any interactions
from a user.”5 Once a computer is infected with the controlling software
(malware), it is commonly called a “bot.” When a program is installed
on a computer in a manner that joins similar computers into a network
with the same program, then a botnet is created. In the beginning,
networks of computers controlled by a centralized server were designed
to automatically execute certain repetitive tasks; in other words, they
were performing beneficial functions.6 Although botnets do not have to
be malicious, in today’s environment they are almost always referred
to as such.
An essential aspect of a botnet is that another party, at a distance,
controls the network of infected computers. Interestingly, it is surmised
that the systematic spread of bots was advanced by the music-sharing
service Napster, which used a central server in order to facilitate music
sharing.7 Today, the entity or person in control of a botnet is known as
a “botherder,” or “botmaster.”8 The server(s), or computer(s), that

4. See Kim Zetter, With Court Order, FBI Hijacks ‘Coreflood’ Botnet, Sends Kill Signal,
WIRED (Apr. 13, 2011, 6:17 P.M.), http://www.wired.com/2011/04/coreflood/ (quoting critical
comments from Chris Palmer at the Electronic Frontier Foundation; about the possibility for
unintended consequences).
5. JULIAN B. GRIZZARD ET AL., PEER-TO-PEER BOTNETS: OVERVIEW AND CASE STUDY 2
(2007), available at https://www.usenix.org/conference/hotbots-07/peer-peer-botnets-overview
-and-case-study.
6. See id. at 1.
7. Id. at 2.
8. See LUIS VIHUL ET AL., NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF
EXCELLENCE & EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFORMATION SECURITY AGENCY, LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTERING BOTNETS 4 (2012) (comparing the laws of Estonia and Germany
as applied to botnet remediation efforts).
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functions as a central control point of control for the bots is known as
a “command and control” (C&C) server.9
In comparison to the C&C centralized architecture described
above, botnets can employ a decentralized control system without a
central control point. These distributed botnets use a peer-to-peer (P2P)
communication system. Instead of querying the control server(s) for
updates and instructions, P2P botnets are designed so that individual
computers share and spread commands, thereby avoiding the
vulnerability of a central C&C server. P2P botnets have become
increasingly more complex and resilient to takedown, and the number
of P2P botnets have increased five-fold over the last year.10
In the vast majority of cases, an unauthorized, malicious
software/program is installed surreptitiously with the intent to use the
bot in a botnet for a criminal and harmful purpose. Yet it is not always
so. Groups of like-minded individuals can voluntarily allow their
computers to be infected with a bot in order to accomplish a common
purpose. The hactivist group Anonymous uses this strategy, making it
as easy as checking a box to sign up to participate in a botnet.11 As a
result, individuals may become part of a greater online protest
movement by voluntarily joining a botnet; for example, the botnet may
be used to launch an attack on a website in order to make a political
statement.12
Botnets have become a commodity. A person does not need to be
technically advanced to rent a botnet by the hour or to buy one outright.
In 2012, one could rent a botnet for $2 an hour, or could purchase it for
$700.13 More sophisticated botnets were recently “sold as a service” for

9. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PROACTIVE POLICY MEASURES BY
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AGAINST BOTNETS 8 (2012); see also Yacin Nadji et al.,
Beheading Hydras: Performing Effective Botnet Takedowns, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2013 ACM
CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMMC’NS SEC. 121 (2013).
10. Michael Mimoso, Number of Peer-to-Peer Botnets Grows 5X, THREATPOST BLOG
(June 5, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://threatpost.com/number-of-peer-to-peer-botnets-grows-5x.
11. See Ryan Singel, Joining Pro-Wikileaks Attacks is as Easy as Clicking a Button, WIRED
(Dec. 10, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/web20-attack-anonymous/.
12 See NART VILLENEUVE, KOOBFACE: INSIDE A CRIMEWARE NETWORK 3 (2010),
available at http://www.infowar-monitor.net/reports/iwm-koobface.pdf (“It [a botnet] can be used
to direct computers to click on fake advertisements for Viagra or marshal them together to attack
a meddlesome human rights website, as it is with increasing frequency from Iran and Kazakhstan
to Burma and Vietnam.”).
13. Ian Steadman, The Russian Underground has Democratized Cybercrime, WIRED (Nov.
2, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-11/02/russian-cybercrime.
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$60,000 to $120,000 per year.14 The cost of purchasing a botnet pales
in comparison to the estimated potential income generated, between ten
thousand and ten million dollars per month.15
The Trend Micro Global Botnet Threat Activity Map, capturing
real-time activity, reported 9,451 C&C active servers, and 8,283,061
botnet connections, at the time this article was written.16 It is difficult
to measure the extent of botnet infections worldwide, or to estimate the
cumulative damage to computer owners and ultimate victims.
However, botnets provide a major transportation mode for cybercrime,
and yearly estimates of cybercrime damages vary from between $110
billion to $1 trillion per year.17
It is only too obvious that botnets are a scourge of the Internet,
despite concerted actions to thwart their spread. Companies adopt
security defenses, individuals attempt to update security software,
security firms and researchers work continuously to learn about and
dismantle botnet threats. One of the first collaborative, large-scale,
efforts took place to thwart the worm known as Conficker, which was
poised to become a huge international botnet.18 The takedown,
described in the following section, was accomplished primarily by
private entities with international cooperation, including ICANN and
associated entity participation, but it lacked significant government
involvement.19

14. See ALAN NEVILLE & ROSS GIBB, ZEROACCESS INDEPTH 10 (2013), available at
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/zeroac
cess_indepth.pdf.
15. See VIHUL ET AL., supra note 8, at 5. As discussed infra Part III with descriptions of
each of the botnets, criminal activity that produces this income can derive from actions such as
click-fraud, identity theft, password and bank account theft.
16. Global Botnet Threat Activity Map, TREND MICRO, http://www.trendmicro.com/us
/security-intelligence/current-threat-activity/global-botnet-map/index.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2014).
17. See Paul Hyman, Cybercrime: It’s Serious, But Exactly How Serious?, 56 COMMC’NS
OF THE ACM 18, 18 (2013) (noting difference in estimates of cybercrime damages as reported by
Symantec Corp. and McAfee Inc.).
18. See THE RENDON GROUP, CONFICKER WORKING GROUP: LESSONS LEARNED 13
(2011). This report was funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Science and
Technology Directorate to study the Conficker Working Group and report on its success and
challenges. Id. at 2.
19. See id. at 26 (stating that “the [federal] government’s coordination with the Working
Group was limited and contributed little to the private sector effort.”); see also id. at 19 (describing
the informal communication between some members of the Conficker Working Group and
various agencies).
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B. The Conficker Working Group
In October of 2008, Microsoft (MS) issued a “critical” security
patch for certain Windows and Windows-server software because, in
part, the malicious use of the vulnerability to install a computer worm
known as Conficker could result in a computer being recruited into a
botnet.20 Ironically, releases of vulnerability information and patches
are known to sometimes create the opposite result; malware can be
propagated seeking to exploit the weakness before computers are
updated. The Conficker worm, discovered in November 2008, sought
to infect computers through this MS vulnerability, however it was
different from other worms in its sophistication, growth, and
resiliency.21 While Conficker utilized a C&C framework whereby bots
contact the central server for instructions, it also implemented a more
dynamic communications structure. Conficker’s first version used
mathematical algorithms to generate multiple, dynamically changing,
C&C locations from 250 domain names each (rather than IP addresses)
from five top-level domains. Subsequent evolutions of the virus
increased the number of control domain names significantly (“tens of
thousands”),22 and at one point resorted to peer-to-peer
communications (rather than C&C), all in order to avoid detection and
destruction.
Communication between the bot and control location was
encrypted, and the strength of encryption increased in subsequent
versions of Conficker.23 For purposes of this discussion, it is enough to
note that as security measures and tactics ratcheted up, each step was
met with renewed sophistication in the worm architecture. Within one
year, despite efforts of the security community, an estimated five to six
million IP addresses (and perhaps up to 13 million computers) were
infected with some version of Conficker, and therefore were potential
weapons in a botnet arsenal.24
20. See id. at 3.
21. See id. at 5.
22. DAVE PISCITELLO, ICANN SECURITIES TEAM, CONFICKER SUMMARY AND REVIEW 17
(2010), available at https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/conficker-summary-review-07
may10-en.pdf.
23. For a chronology of the evolution and different variations of Conficker, see KADRI
KASKA, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, CONFICKER
CONSIDERATIONS IN LAW AND POLICY 8–15 (2012) (a report of the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence in Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia).
24. See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 10.
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Throughout the battle against Conficker, the identity of the
worm’s author was unknown, and it remains unknown today.25 In
addition, the purpose of the potentially powerful botnet was, and
remains today, unknown.26 This uncertainty and yet large potential for
harm increased the sense of urgency to take action to defeat the
potential use of the botnet.27 At the outset, security firms, university
researchers, and a variety of private entities worked in parallel, with
information sharing based on personal trust, to develop methods to
destroy the worm and to inform the public about patches.28 It was not
until a symposium on domain name system (DNS) security in Atlanta,
Georgia in February 2009, however, that a coordinated effort began by
means of the informal Conficker Working Group.29 Representatives
from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) were present at the meeting, and their cooperation became
fundamental to the Conficker botnet takedown because of the
fraudulent use of domain names to direct bots to a control server.30 In
order to takedown a botnet with a C&C server, discovering the identity
of the server is key; knowing the identity and location of the server will
allow measures to be taken to disrupt the communications or shut down
the sever itself, perhaps even by physical means.31
When members of the Working Group decrypted the algorithm
for the dynamic communications, they then determined to buy the
domains from Internet registrars ahead of the automated Conficker
program in order to block its orders and updates to individual
computers.32 However, the sheer volume of domains utilized proved
too costly to purchase in bulk, even for a resource rich entity such as
Microsoft who was involved in the effort.33 In addition, the domains
used different country codes, and therefore increased the complexity of
the botnet mitigation efforts.34 Although it was surmised that the

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See KASKA, supra note 23, at 18.
Id.
See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 12–14.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 6.
See GRIZZARD, supra note 5, at 1.
See THE RENDON GROUP, supra note 18, at 16–18.
See PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 6.
See THE RENDON GROUP, supra note 18, at 7.
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Conficker worm originated from the Ukraine,35 many of the domain
names generated in the algorithm were of Chinese denomination.36 To
solve this conundrum of global reach, ICANN took the lead by
agreeing: (1) to waive domain name registration fees as far as possible
for the Working Group; and (2) to give prior notice to over 100 toplevel country domain registrars that certain domain names would be
automatically registered by Conficker.37 Thus, the registries could
block the registration of C&C names by Conficker; this coordinated
action rendered the botnet unable to communicate with or direct the
botnet, effectively disabling it. Reporting on the collaborative effort to
takedown Conficker, an ICANN document makes two interesting
comments. First, it recognized the ground-breaking nature of the group
composition, saying that, “The operational response to Conficker is
perhaps as landmark an event as the worm itself.”38 In contrast,
however, it also stated that, “The community cannot rely on all
contractual matters [such as waiving fees] to be so easily handled for
all future incidents.”39
Although law enforcement engagement with the Conficker
Working Group and potential botnet was minimal, its attention to
cybercrime was not. Since botnets are the vehicle for accomplishing
many types of cybercriminal activity, law enforcement also became
directly involved in attempts to disable those threats.
C. The FBI and DoJ
The Coreflood computer virus infected an estimated two million
computers globally and was active for at least ten years.40 When the
Coreflood virus installed on a user’s computer, it was then possible to
enlist it as a bot in a future botnet.41 In particular, Coreflood could log
user keystrokes, obtain account passwords, and facilitate bank fraud
and theft.42

35. Id. at 6. But some also hypothesized that the author was a nation–state. Id. at 9.
36. See id. at 19.
37. See id. at 20–21.
38. PISCITELLO, supra note 22, at 1.
39. Id. at 14.
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice Takes Action to Disable Int’l
Botnet (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/newhaven/press-releases/2011/nh041311.htm.
41. Coreflood is both the name of the virus and the name of the botnet.
42. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40.
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Not surprisingly, the breadth and depth of Coreflood infections
and resulting botnet harms spurred an FBI investigation that resulted in
legal action by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ); importantly,
Coreflood was the first law enforcement and legal action to shut down
an active botnet.43 The initiating complaint described a botnet in
general as “inherently a creature of crime,”44 and “a threat to national
security.”45 The specific charges against the unknown Coreflood botnet
operators included wire fraud, bank fraud, and unauthorized access to
electronic communications.46 Estimates of Coreflood damages
exceeded $20 million.47
The Coreflood botnet operated similarly to the previously
described Conficker design (except at a simpler level), as the C&C
server located at certain IP addresses would change domain names in
order to evade disabling.48 However, domain name changes were
programmed in the malware to occur twice per month, and those
specific domain names were uncovered by the investigation.49 The
legal action was designed not to arrest and imprison the perpetrators of
the botnet, as yet unknown, but to stop the operation of the malicious
software installed on unsuspecting user computers. On April 11, 2011,
the DoJ announced that under the authority of a temporary restraining
order it had seized command and control servers and redirected botnet
traffic to substitute servers, disabling the functions of the botnet and
giving victims the opportunity to cleanse the Coreflood software from
their computers.50

43. Id.
44. Complaint at 3, U.S. v. John Does 1-13, No. 3:1-CV-561 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter Coreflood complaint].
45. Id. at 3–4.
46. See id. at 10–12 (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, and 2511,
respectively).
47. NAT’L CYBER INVESTIGATIVE JOINT TASK FORCE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
OPERATION CLEAN SLATE 3, available at http://www.wpcug.org/Downloads/National%20Cyber
%20Investigative%20Joint%20Task%20Force.pdf.
48. See Coreflood Complaint, supra note 44, at 5–7.
49. Id. at 6–7.
50. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40. Jurisdiction was granted based on evidence of
the large number of computers infected in the United States, allegations of specific instances of
bank and wire fraud in the United States and the unauthorized access to computers in interstate
commerce under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). See Coreflood Complaint, supra
note 44, at 3.
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In particular, the DoJ seized 29 domain names and 5 servers that
were a part of the C&C structure, and concurrently substituted FBImanaged servers in the C&C structure.51 In addition, the TRO granted
permission for the substituted servers to send a temporary disabling
command to the malware.52 Sending this “stop” command was
authorized “only to computers reasonably determined to be in the
United States.”53 The DoJ was prohibited from accessing any content
information from the infected computer, its access restricted to data of
“originating IP address, network port, and the date and time of
transmission.”54 The extraordinary remedy allowing the government to
substitute servers in the C&C infrastructure and send electronic
instructions to individual computers was based, in part, on the “special
needs, including the need to protect the public and to perform
community caretaking functions, that are beyond the normal need for
law enforcement . . . .”55
Meanwhile, security firms continued to work on a lasting patch
for the Coreflood vulnerability.56 In addition, evidence showed that the
overall result of the actions rid the Coreflood virus from 90% of
infected computers in the United States.57 Included in this number were
private parties, businesses, governments, hospitals, and universities.58
Stopping the Coreflood botnet operations would only be a
temporary patch, however, if the malware itself were not eliminated
from user computers. Victim notification, numbering in the hundreds
of thousands, occurred primarily by sharing IP addresses of infected
customers with the respective Internet Service Provider (ISP) and
requesting that a form notification be delivered to those customers.59 In
arguably a further extension of the extraordinary means taken to disable

51. See DoJ Press Release, supra note 40.
52. Temporary Restraining Order at 5–6, U.S. v. John Does 1-13, No. 3:11-CV-561 (D.
Conn. Apr. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Coreflood TRO].
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Supplemental Memo. in Support of Prelim. Inj. at 5, U.S. v. John Does 1–13, No. 3:11CV-561 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Supplemental Memo].
57. Id. at 10–11.
58. Coordinated Law Enforcement Action Leads to Massive Reduction in Size of
International Botnet, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog
/coordinated-law-enforcement-action-leads-massive-reduction-size-international-botnet.
59. See Supplemental Memo, supra note 56, at 5–6.
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the botnet, the FBI sent direct notices to “Identifiable Victims,”60
including “seventeen state or local government agencies, including one
policy department; three airports; two defense contractors; five banks
or financial institutions; approximately thirty colleges or universities;
approximately twenty hospital or health care companies; and hundreds
of businesses”61 explaining that they could authorize the FBI to delete
the Coreflood virus from their computers.62 With written consent, the
government uninstalled the software directly from the user’s
computer.63
Stopping the Coreflood virus involved cross-border action. The
botnet servers were located around the world, outside the jurisdictional
reach of U.S. courts. In order to disable the botnet, the FBI targeted
what it could reach within the United States; it requested and the court
ordered the domain name providers to “impose a registry lock on the
Internet domain name[s]” including any account associated with it.64
Stopping with the seizure of domestic C&C computers would not have
disabled the botnet for any length of time. The government strategy
was effective because it avoided ICANN’s participation by using a
court order issued to the domain providers to accomplish the same
result. Providers were primarily located in the United States, however
some were also in Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Australia;
voluntary cooperation of the domain name providers in these foreign
jurisdictions assisted the takedown.65
The Coreflood takedown was subject to criticism from various
quarters. The action was labeled “a first in the U.S. . . . that . . . gave
law enforcement permission to interfere directly with computers
belonging to users who weren't being investigated, or charged with any
crime.”66 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) celebrated the
takedown of the botnet, but raised questions about the wisdom of a
strategy that included an “extraordinary” governmental intrusion into
individual computers; an EFF representative commented that the risk
60. See id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 7.
63. Id. at 12–13. The government did not request court approval for uninstalling the virus
because it did so only upon the user’s written permission. Id.
64. Coreflood TRO, supra note 52, at 6.
65. See id. at Schedule A.
66. Chris Paoli, Feds Move Forward on Coreflood Botnet Removal, GCN (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/04/28/ECG-Feds-To-Remove-Coreflood.
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of harm was too great and that “[i]f nothing horrible comes of this, it
will be because of a combination of sheer luck and surprising politeness
on behalf of the malware authors.”67 Others questioned the precedent
set by such an aggressive posture because “[i]t’s getting the FBI
involved in an area where they traditionally haven’t been involved.
What’s stopping [the FBI] from going all the way to the extreme and
shutting down political discourse they don’t like?”68 On the opposite
end of the spectrum, some questioned whether the FBI went far enough.
Since the botnet was a threat to the security of the Internet, should the
FBI have gone further and cleaned users’ computers even without
explicit permission? An informal survey, directed at the security
community, found support for this more aggressive approach.69
Microsoft’s first civil lawsuit to dismantle botnets was launched
before the Coreflood action, however its strategy can be viewed in
contrast to the law enforcement action and the voluntary Conficker
collaborative effort, and the inherent difficulties with each. Though MS
took the lead as plaintiff in each of the cases discussed, security
professionals, academics, and other interested parties were crucial to
the takedown efforts.70 For purposes of much of the following
discussion however, based on their lead plaintiff role, the discussion
refers only to Microsoft.

67. Dan Kaplan, Coreflood Takedown May Lead to Trouble, SC MAG. (Apr. 18, 2011),
http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/254827,coreflood-takedown-may-lead-to-trouble.aspx.
68. Id.; see also Bruce Schneier, Hijacking the Coreflood Botnet, SCHNEIER ON SEC. BLOG
(May 2, 2011, 6:52 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/hijacking
_the_c.html (supporting the action as necessary to preserve the Internet, but questioning whether
it created a “slippery slope” for more widespread actions).
69. See Paul Ducklin, FBI Takes On Coreflood Botnet—But is This a Step Too Far?,
NAKED SECURITY (Apr. 28, 2011), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/04/28/fbi-takes-on
-coreflood-botnet-step-too-far/.
70. See discussion infra Part II.

08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/27/2015 1:51 PM

CIVIL CYBER CONFLICT

177

II. THE FIRST MICROSOFT OFFENSIVE
In February 2010, Microsoft announced the “first of its kind”
takedown of a botnet based on collaborative technical and legal
action.71 The Waledac botnet takedown targeted a botnet that could
potentially send 1.5 billion unsolicited spam emails per day.72 Among
others, the emails included solicitations for fraudulent products and
services, malware that enlisted more computers into the botnet, and the
installation of malicious software that stole financial and personal
information from the user.73 In addition, the botnet software modified
Microsoft Window’s operating system, suspended authentic security
updates, and caused users to install fake, injurious “security”
software.74 Waledac owners sold the use of the botnet as a service to
third parties, therefore dispersing the various unauthorized and
criminal activities across the globe.75 Microsoft received thousands of
complaints76 from customers, who believed that the malfunction of
their computer was due to defects in Microsoft products, and who
believed that the spam email originated from Microsoft.77
The technical team identified over 200 domain names used in the
C&C architecture of the botnet.78 While a detailed technical description
is beyond the scope of this article, a few aspects of the Waledac
structure are relevant to understanding how the legal action and court

71. See Tim Cranton, Cracking Down on Botnets, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 24,
2010, 6:16 PM), http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2010/02/24/cracking-down-on-botnets/ (“This
legal and industry operation against Waledac is the first of its kind, but it won’t be the last. With
this action, done in cooperation with experts from Shadowserver, the University of Washington,
Symantec, University of Mannheim, Technical University in Vienna, International Secure
Systems Lab, the University of Bonn and others, we’re building on other important work across
the global security community to combat botnets.”).
72. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause RE Preliminary Injunction at 2, Microsoft Corp. v.
John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Brief]; see also
Brian Krebs, Microsoft Ambushes Waledac Botnet, Shutters Whistleblower Site, KREBS ON
SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:33 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/02/microsoft-ambushes
-waledac-botnet-shutters-whistleblower-site/.
73. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 16–18.
74. See Complaint at 8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va.
Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Complaint].
75. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Recommendations at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John
Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Waledac Findings of Fact].
76. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 3.
77. Id. at 8–9.
78. Id. at 6.
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orders were essential components of disabling the botnet. The Waledac
infrastructure was tiered, described by Microsoft as consisting of
Spammer Nodes, Repeater Nodes, TSL servers, and at the top-level the
Main Command and Control servers.79 The Spammer Nodes consisted
of individual user computers infected with the controlling botnet
malware, and situated behind firewalls rather than connected directly
to the Internet. Spammer Nodes automatically communicated with and
followed the orders of the controller of the botnet through a system that
utilized the Repeater Nodes. Repeater Nodes were used for several
purposes, including both as a communicating device between the
different layers of the botnet, and as DNS servers, which resolve an IP
address to a domain name. A third layer consisted of the TSL servers,
acting as a wall to obfuscate and protect the identity of the ultimate
botnet controller. Communications would pass through the TSL servers
to the last layer, the Main Command and Control Servers, which were
directly controlled by the owner(s) of the botnet, otherwise known as
the bot herder(s).80 In addition, DNS fast flux servers were utilized to
constantly change the domain names associated with IP addresses with
the root zone at Internet registrars. In summary, the design of the botnet
infrastructure made technical remediation difficult to accomplish.81
Microsoft designed an offensive strategy to disrupt the 277
domain names that facilitated communications among the tiers of the
botnet. As they explained, “[t]hese 273 [4 were later added] domains
continuously control the ability of the computers that make up the
Waledac botnet to communicate with each other and to grow the
botnet,”82 and “[t]hese domains have no legitimate purpose. . . . The
domains’ sole purpose is to await requests from botnet computers and
instruct them on how to continue communicating with each other and
to infect new user computers.”83 Without a communication structure,
the botnet would be unable to operate, even though individual

79. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74.
80. Id. at 7.
81. See id. at 7–10. It was difficult to reach the spammer node, individual user computers,
to stop the infection because they were behind firewalls; difficult to reach the Fast Flux servers
because they were routed and hidden behind the Repeater Node computers; difficult to reach the
Repeater Node servers because their location was changing due to the continuous action by the
Fast Flux servers; and difficult to reach the Command and Control servers because their identity
was protected by the Repeater Nodes and the lack of a direct connection to Spammer Nodes.
82. Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 6.
83. Id. at 7.
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computers would still be infected with malicious software. The adopted
strategy involved taking swift and secret action to take the botnet
domain names off the Internet before the botnet controllers could
change their location.84 Therefore, Microsoft sued 27 John Doe
defendants that were registered as the owners of the domain names,
based on allegations of violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA), CAN-SPAM Act, Electronic Communications and
Privacy Act (ECPA), false designation of origin and trademark dilution
under the Lanham Act, trespass to chattels, and unjust enrichment and
conversion.85 Importantly, Microsoft requested an ex parte proceeding
and a Preliminary Injunction to instruct the domain name registrar,
VeriSign, to “lock” the domain names while it attempted to identify the
owners of the domains and serve process upon them.86
A. Legal Allegations
In general, one of the most often applicable statutes used to pursue
prosecution for hacking or the propagation of malicious software is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.87 A criminal statute, the CFAA grants
a civil right of action for criminal acts when certain injuries occur.88
The applicable sections of the CFAA provide a civil remedy of
damages, an injunction and equitable remedies when a person
intentionally gains unauthorized access, or exceeds authorized access,
to a computer used in interstate commerce and either causes aggregate
loss of at least $5,000, affects medical treatment of an individual,
personal physical injury, or causes a threat to public health or safety.89
Microsoft alleged that the Waledac botnet accessed its computers and
those of its customers intentionally and without authorization, to obtain
information, commit fraud, and to cause damage by transferring
malicious computer programs and code.90
84. See Waledac: The Legal Action Plan, MICROSOFT SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT,
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/story/default.aspx#!waledac_legal [hereinafter Legal
Action Plan].
85. See infra Part III.A.
86. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84; see also infra Part III.B.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). See generally Lee Goldman, Interpreting the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–4, 11–12 (2012) (describing the CFAA
as primarily an anti-hacking statute).
88. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). The additional requirements are found in id.
§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)–(V).
90. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 13.
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Waledac sent hundreds of thousands of spam emails to
individuals. Microsoft, in its capacity as an Internet service provider,
for example a provider of the Hotmail service, was able to file a civil
action for violations of the CAN-SPAM Act of 200391 based in part on
false header and deceptive use of the emails.92 Microsoft also alleged
violations based on the absence of return addresses, opt-out provisions,
and the lack of clear indications of the emails’ advertising nature.93
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)94 is also a
criminal statute that allows for a civil remedy, prohibiting interception
of electronic communications without authorization.95 Microsoft
alleged that the Waledac botnet intercepted and interfered with both
customer and Microsoft emails in storage at Microsoft, at its customers’
computers, and “within Microsoft’s licensed operating system.”96
Trespass to chattels is a common law tort that has been used to
pursue remedies for previous electronic intrusion or unauthorized use
cases, and the conversion allegation is a related theory.97 Microsoft
alleged trespass to chattels based on the harm caused by the intentional,
unsolicited emails sent by the botnets, and the unauthorized access to
its computers.98

91. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2006).
92. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 13.
93. Id.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
95. See DIRECTV v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Section 2511 provides in
relevant part that ‘[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who . . .
intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . electronic communication’ is subject to criminal penalties or
civil suit by the federal government. Appearing later in the same chapter, § 2520 expressly
authorizes private suits by ‘any person whose . . . electronic communication is intercepted . . . in
violation of this chapter.’ Both sections reference the interception of electronic communications.
The linguistic interlock between the two provisions could not be tighter, nor more obviously
deliberate: § 2511(1)(a) renders unlawful the unauthorized interception of electronic
communications, including encrypted satellite television broadcasts, while § 2520(a) authorizes
private suit against those who have engaged in such activities.”) (citations omitted).
96. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 15.
97. See T. Luis de Guzman, Unleashing a Cure for the Botnet Zombie Plague: Cybertorts,
Counterstrikes, and Privileges, 59 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 527, 531–38 (2010) (reviewing cases
under trespass theories and arguing for extension of negligence theory). See generally Catherine
M. Sharkey, Trespass Torts and Self-Help for an Electronic Age, 44 TULSA L. REV. 677 (2009)
(discussing trespass to chattels in Internet cases and arguing for a self help right for victims).
98. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 17.
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The Lanham Act dilution99 and false designation of origin100
provisions were used by a business early in the digital era to
successfully pursue a civil case when the spammer used false email
headers.101 Microsoft alleged that the Waledac botnet used the
trademarks of Microsoft, Windows, and Hotmail in ways that were
misleading and caused confusion with customers about the source of
the spam email and fake anti-virus software offered as MS
antispyware.102 In addition, the association of Microsoft’s famous
trademarks with the malicious software caused “blurring and dilution
by tarnishment” when it “creat[ed] keys and writing entries under a
registry path that include[ed] the Microsoft marks,”103 all remedies that
would prove helpful in later botnet takedowns.104
Lastly, Microsoft alleged liability for the botnet’s activities based
on the general common law conception of unjust enrichment.105 They
argued that botnet operators “profited unjustly”106 by knowingly using
Microsoft computers and customer computers without authorization,
and by using Microsoft licensed software without permission.
Microsoft appealed to principles of equity to argue for disgorgement of
the ill-gotten profits and for payment of damages.107
Microsoft’s combination of legal theories of civil liability
established a legal framework for tackling the takedown of a botnet, a
framework that it would use repeatedly to disable subsequent botnets,
and upon which it would expand future requests for court permission
to take more broad reaching actions. Legal theory alone, however,

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
America Online v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551–52 (E.D. Va. 1998).
See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 19.
Id. at 16–17.
Section 1116 of the Lanham Act states:
[W]ith respect to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services, the court may,
upon ex parte application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section
pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks
involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records
documenting the manufacturer, sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2013).
105. See Waledac Complaint, supra note 74, at 18.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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would not be adequate to takedown the botnet; the legal procedure
strategy was essential for success.
B. Legal Strategy and Procedure
Microsoft designed a procedural legal strategy described in its
Legal Action Plan.108 The legal approach to instituting a takedown
included major challenges, as described by Microsoft:
Cease and desist letters would not force immediate action. Similarly,
domain takedown is inexact and somewhat limited under typical
ICANN procedures. For example, ICANN’s Uniform DomainName Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) provides a relatively long
window in which bad actors would be able to register new domains,
update the botnet code, or take other evasive actions to move the
botnet while the ICANN process unfolded.109

1. Ex Parte Proceeding
Instead of appealing to ICANN and the domain resolution process
to freeze the botnet domain names as was done in Conficker, Microsoft
asked a District Court for an ex parte proceeding without notice to the
defendants (for three days), in order to prevent the bot herders from
automatically moving their C&C structure and destroying evidence.110
The precedent cited for the request was the 2009 Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) emergency ex parte proceeding to dismantle an ISP
that hosted extensive criminal activities, including the control of
botnets.111 In the previous case, the FTC was granted an ex parte TRO
without notice to the ISP because to do otherwise would allow the

108. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84.
109. Id.
110. See App. of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and Order
to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj., Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (LMB/JFA)
(E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2010); Microsoft Corp.’s Motion for a Protective Order Sealing Documents,
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2010) (citing FED. R.
CIV. PROC. 26(c)(1)).
111. FTC v. Pricewert, LLC, No. 09-2407 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2009); see also Press Release,
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Permanently Shuts Down Notorious Rogue Internet Service Provider
(May 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/05/ftc-permanently-shuts
-down-notorious-rogue-internet-service. Microsoft’s approach mirrored this case in many
procedural ways although the legal theories differed.
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defendant to dispose of evidence of wrongdoing and move its
operations.112
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for ex parte hearings,
but the court will normally require that the plaintiff first produce
evidence of attempted notification to the defendant.113 Microsoft
requested that notification be delayed until after the domains were
rendered inoperable; otherwise the botnet would move its location to
avoid disruption. Microsoft’s legal argument relied on a 1979 case, In
re Louis Vuitton Et Fils S.A.,114 in which the court allowed the ex parte
order without notification because to do otherwise would allow the
defendant to dispose of physical evidence. Importantly, Microsoft
provided detailed information about how it would satisfy due process
and provide notice to the defendants at the later time.115 MS pledged to
utilize all methods of notification possible, including notification by
means of:
(1) [T]he Hague Convention on Service Abroad by sending the
Complaint, Summons and all other documents to the Chinese
Ministry of Justice; (2) alternative methods, including service and
notice by email, facsimile, and by mail; and (3) publication of all
relevant pleadings on a website Microsoft set up solely to provide
the domain registrants with notice.116

Microsoft faced the possibility that at least some of the domain names
were “hijacked” by the botnet; thus, they named additional John Doe
defendants in order to preserve the rights of any innocent victims.117
The domain names included Chinese registrants, also likely falsified,

112. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause at 2–3, FTC v.
Pricewert, LLC, No. 09-2407 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2009).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 65 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Issuing Without Notice. The court may issue a temporary restraining order
without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:
(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant
before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give
notice and the reasons why it should not be required.
FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (2014).
114. 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979).
115. See Waledac Brief, supra note 72, at 24–27.
116. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84.
117. Id.
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therefore Microsoft also promised service of process via the Chinese
Minister of Justice.118
2. Emergency Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction
In concert with the ex parte proceeding, Microsoft requested, and
received, an emergency temporary restraining order enjoining the
malicious activities by the John Does controlling the botnet, and an
order to VeriSign, the domain registry, to shut down the domains at that
level.119 This was the essential action needed to disrupt the
communications structure and disable the use of the botnet: targeting
the domain names acting in the C&C role. Without receiving updated
instructions from the command server, the individual bots would
become inactive. Specifically, the preliminary injunction directed
VeriSign to “lock” the domains, remove them from the zone file,
disallow any changes, hold the domains in escrow, and preserve
evidence of misconduct.120
The legal strategy included sensitivity to the uniqueness of the
lawsuit. Studying precedents of the Eastern District of Virginia, MS
crafted its requests for injunction in order to respond to the concerns
found in previous decisions involving extraordinary procedures.121
Microsoft paid attention to its relationship with the court, noting that
they, “worked very hard to develop and maintain credibility with the
Court by ensuring that its [our] arguments were supported by
substantial evidence and law, and also by offering timely submissions,
avoiding undue delay, and ensuring that it [we] worked with counsel
who was familiar with the Court’s practices.”122
The court granted the preliminary TRO and subsequently the
permanent order, on the basis that Microsoft was likely to succeed on
violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, trespass to chattels,
unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence.123 Microsoft was
granted 14 days under the TRO to shut down the botnet, and it was
118. Id.
119. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Prelim. Inj.,
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10-CV-156 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 2010) [hereinafter
Waledac TRO].
120. Id. at 3–4.
121. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84.
122. Id.
123. See Waledac TRO, supra note 119, at 2.
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ready to act quickly. The domains were shut down within 48 hours, and
within the next 24 hours the Chinese defendants were served with
notice of the pending lawsuit. Email notices were sent to all addresses
of the domain holders listed with the registries, and the takedown action
was widely publicized.124
Microsoft’s attention to the possibility of innocent parties proved
prescient. Stephen Paluck, owner of debtbgonesite.com, claimed his
innocence, and argued that he had no knowledge that his domain was a
part of the botnet.125 Paluck had transferred control of the domain to a
third person, and stated that he did not know who controlled the
domain. As a result, Microsoft purchased the domain name from
Paluck and assisted him in the cleanup of his computer.126 Another
domain name was used as “name-services.com;” after ensuring that this
entity shutoff the domains used in the botnet, Microsoft also dropped
this entity from its lawsuit.127
C. Default Judgment
The Ex Parte Order for an Emergency Temporary Restraining
Order, followed by Service of Process and the grant of a Temporary
Restraining Order, culminated in a Default Judgment that transferred
the domain names to Microsoft.128 As noted in the Findings of Facts:
[T]he only way to enjoin effectively the Doe Defendants’ operation
and propagation of the Waledac Botnet is to permanently deprive
them of the Botnet Domains and transfer control of the domains to
an entity that will ensure that they are not re-infected and revived as
part of the Waledac Botnet. Microsoft is a natural candidate to be
the entity in control of these domains because it is willing to bear

124. See Legal Action Plan, supra note 84. The details of how quickly Microsoft acted and
the extensive ways in which it sought to identify and give notice to the John Doe defendants are
outside the scope of this general article. In brief, documents were translated to Chinese and posted
on an approved website. No responses were received, although Microsoft noted that at one point
after the takedown became public its noticeofpleadings.com site was probed by entities from
Russian IP addresses. See Waledac Findings of Fact, supra note 75, at 16.
125. Microsoft Corp.’s Status Report at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–27, No. 1:10CV-156 (E.D. Va. March 5, 2010).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 3.
128. R.I.P Waledac: Undoing the Damage of a Botnet, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG
(Sept. 8, 2010), http://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2010/09/08/r-i-p-waledac-undoing-the-damage
-of-a-botnet/. VeriSign was ordered to transfer 276 domains to a registrar chosen by Microsoft,
which would then transfer the domains directly to Microsoft. Id.
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the costs associated with ensuring that the domain registrations to
not lapse, it has the technical expertise to ensure that the domains
are not once again taken over by the Waledac Botnet, and it has no
pecuniary interest in controlling those domains.129

III. MICROSOFT TAKEDOWNS EVOLVE
Microsoft executed seven more botnet takedowns in the next three
years. Five of these were undertaken without law enforcement
partnerships, while the two most recent ones in 2013 were collaborative
in nature. The five Microsoft led takedowns primarily built upon the
legal procedure and framework first applied during the Waledac action.
A request for an ex parte proceeding without notice and a Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction was followed by swift action to serve
notice to the defendants. The legal theories argued by these cases also
built upon the strategy established in the Waledac takedown. Yet each
one of these takedowns progressively added to Microsoft’s arsenal
against malicious botnets by addressing additional issues in each
unique case. The following descriptions of the botnet remediations
focus on these additional developments, acknowledging that they build
upon the previously designed fundamental strategy.
A. Rustock
The Rustock botnet was estimated to have infected over one
million individual computers worldwide in 2011, and estimated to
produce 20%–60% of worldwide spam.130 At one point it was estimated
to be the largest purveyor of spam in the world, dubbed the “King of
Spam.”131 Spam emails generated by the Rustock were primarily used
to sell unregulated generic pharmaceuticals, particularly those properly
manufactured by Pfizer, but they also targeted Hotmail users with false
lottery scams, for example, and caused loss of financial information
and associated damages.132 Rustock was particularly virulent because
it infected the user’s software so completely, and at such a fundamental

129. See Waledac Findings of Fact, supra note 75, at 20.
130. Complaint at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
9, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock Complaint].
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id.
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level, that the average user could not detect the infection or clean the
malicious software from their computer without technical assistance.133
Microsoft identified 96 Rustock C&C servers located in the
United States and named 5 data centers that hosted related botnet
domains.134 Similarly to the Waledac botnet takedown, Microsoft
requested that the domains be blocked by third parties and removed
from the zone root file in order to disrupt the communications of the
botnet.135 Before granting a preliminary injunction, the court requested
legal authority for the order to non-party third parties.136 Microsoft
argued the All Writs Act of 1789 as the legal basis for the order, which
states: “The Supreme Court and all court established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.”137 Courts have used the All Writs Act as the basis for orders to
third parties ranging from telephone companies that must participate in
wiretaps, to individuals who must stop interfering with school
desegregation.138
Another new development in the Rustock takedown was the
seizure all of the computers, files, and related information from the
location of the servers rather than focusing the remedy on the IP
addresses; this was necessary because, “the masterminds behind
Rustock designed their infected computers to receive instructions from
Internet protocol addresses tied to specific command-and-control
machines.”139 The court order allowed Microsoft attorneys and experts
to accompany U.S. marshals during the seizure to determine the
“computers, servers, electronic data storage devices, or media”140 to be

133. Microsoft Corp.’s Application for an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order,
Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 10–11, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does
1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock TRO Application].
134. See Rustock Complaint, supra note 130, at 8.
135. See Rustock TRO Application, supra note 133, at 2.
136. Microsoft Supp. Brief in Support of Application for an Emergency Temporary
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 1, Microsoft Corp.
v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Rustock Supplemental
Brief].
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
138. See Rustock Supplemental Brief, supra note 136, at 2–3.
139. Nick Wingfield, Spam Network Shut Down, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703328404576207173861008758.
140. Order for Prelim. Inj. at 8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 9, 2011).
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seized. The premise for seizing the computers and related physical
materials rested upon the “overwhelming risk” that the botnet would
move to another location and continue its operation.141 Importantly, the
Lanham Act provided the legal basis for Microsoft’s seizure of the
offending articles and records because they were products of or related
to trademark infringement.142
Thus, the Rustock case added legal specificity for court authority
to order third parties to botnet takedowns by purging IP addresses and
domain names from the Internet, and preserving evidence.
Furthermore, it established the Lanham Act as a viable vehicle for
Microsoft to seize physical botnet property and increased the ability of
Microsoft to pursue the eradication of botnets through the civil system.
As a result, security experts found that Rustock produced spam
“nosedived,”143 as the takedown was speculated to be the “largest
takedown in the history of the Internet.”144 For example, one entity
reported a decrease from one to two thousand Rustock spam emails per
second, to merely one to two spam emails per second.145
B. Kelihos
In 2011, Microsoft sued an individual and limited liability
company located in the Czech Republic, and John Does, in order to
disable a botnet known as Kelihos.146 While both known defendants
were located outside of the United States, jurisdiction in the Virginia
court was based on the business that they did in Virginia, the malicious
code directed at persons in Virginia, and the continued botnet activity
involving Virginia-based computers.147

141. See Rustock TRO Application, supra note 133, at 28.
142. Temporary Restraining Order and Seizure Order at 6–9, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does
1–11, No. C11-0222 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 9, 2011). Paragraph F of the order states that the seizure
is authorized under § 1116(d) of the Lanham Act, however the judge added a handwritten note at
the end of the order that “[a]ll actions undertaken under the authority of this Order shall be in
strict compliance with 15 U.S.C. 1116,” implying that the court was keenly aware of the
significance of this action. Id. at 11.
143. See Brian Krebs, Rustock Botnet Flatlined, Spam Volumes Plummet, KREBS ON
SECURITY (Mar. 18, 2011, 10:04 AM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/03/rustock-botnet-flat
lined-spam-volumes-plummet/.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Complaint at 1, Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter Kelihos Complaint].
147. Id. at 6–7.
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The owners of the two IP addresses had issued 21 subdomains that
were an active part of the Kelihos botnet.148 The Kelihos structure was
similar to the Waledac botnet, and Microsoft used similar legal tactics
and court proceedings to disable it, including orders to third parties to
freeze and disable the domains and preserve evidence.149 However, it
added a negligence allegation to the action, arguing that the act of
hosting subdomains and registering owners imposed a duty on the
defendants not to allow the IP addresses and domain names to be used
for malicious, botnet purposes; the basis of the duty being, among
others, the “domain registration and IP hosting agreements and policies
entered into by defendants . . . [in their] domain registration
agreements.”150 Additionally, Microsoft alleged that the defendants
knew about, assisted, and benefited from the malicious actions of the
subdomain holders.151
Microsoft and the defendants settled the dispute, agreeing in a
Consent Preliminary Injunction that the two defendants would “disable
malicious subdomains and [adopt] a process to verify the identities of
sub-domain registrants.”152 The Kelihos litigation is instructive in
several aspects. First, geographical location of a defendant outside the
United States is not necessarily an impediment to an effective legal
action when the domain registry (in this case VeriSign), or registrar,153
is located in the United States and thus subject to the court’s
jurisdiction. Due to the Internet infrastructure, a registry or registrar

148. Id.
149. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 6–7,
Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2011). A larger number of third
parties were subject to the order, including VeriSign (Va.), ARIN (Va.), ATT Internet Services
(Tx.), Charter Communications (Mo.), Internet.bs Corp. (Bahamas), and Moniker Online Services
(Cal.). Id. at app. A.
150. Kelihos Complaint, supra note 146, at 22.
151. Id. at 5.
152. Consent Prelim. Inj., Microsoft Corp. v. Piatti, No. 1:11-CV-1017 (E.D. Va. Oct. 12,
2011).
153. A registry operates the top-level domain addresses, such as .com in the case of
VeriSign. See .com Registry Agreement, ICANN (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.icann.org/en/about
/agreements/registries/com. A registrar sells domain names to individuals. For a description of
registrar responsibilities, see Registrant Educational Materials, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en
/resources/registrars/registrant-rights/educational (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), headquartered in the United States, is,
in simple terms, the organization that coordinates the workings of Internet communication. See
generally Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome (last visited
Jan. 24, 2015).
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can take effective action to block the malicious domains or IP addresses
from the Internet when ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Thus, even though not reaching an out-of-state defendant personally, a
private action has the capability to reach the defendant’s Internet
presence by means of a court order to an in-state registry or registrar.
Second, Microsoft served notice to those who facilitate, or turn a blind
eye, to botnet activity that they would not be insulated from liability.
Assuming that the defendants in the Kelihos case did not directly
participate in the illegal activity or botnet structure of the domain
holders, they were nonetheless instrumental in facilitating the activity.
The Kelihos action was a lesson to those who sell Internet domains that
they have a duty to see the obvious, and that they must have procedures
to prevent illegal and malicious actors from operating in their domains.
C. Zeus
The Financial Services-Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(FS-ISAC) and the National Automated Clearing House Association
(NACHA) joined Microsoft as plaintiffs in a legal action in March 2012
to takedown the Zeus botnet.154 The allegations stated that 13 million
computers were involuntarily enlisted into the botnet, which was
responsible for the theft of over $100 million in five years.155 Using a
botnet structure, the defendants tricked individuals into interacting with
a fake web interface that looked very similar to one that the plaintiffs
would ordinarily use.156 During the interaction, malware would be
surreptitiously and fraudulently installed that would steal the user’s
account logins, especially designed to steal online banking
information.157 The interface would also collect personal and financial
information, and the installed malware would secretly and
surreptitiously take money from customer bank accounts, even during

154. See Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. March
19, 2012) [hereinafter Zeus Complaint].
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id. at 20–21, 24–25 (“The websites of nearly every major financial institution,
Microsoft and a wide array of other Internet companies have been targeted by the Defendants and
the Zeus Botnets in this way.”). The general name for this type of activity is phishing. See Internet
Crime Schemes, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER, http://www.ic3.gov/crime
schemes.aspx#item-14 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). For further discussion about different methods
of cyberattacks/weapons, see Gary D. Brown & Andrew O. Metcalf, Easier Said Than Done:
Legal Reviews of Cyber Weapons, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 115, 120–27 (2014).
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the customer’s own online transaction, and wire it to a botnet
owner’s/agent’s account.158
Zeus was a global, criminal operation controlled and coordinated
by several individual creators159 who sold the software code in ‘builder
kits’ to other criminals.160 This botnet as a service could be purchased
for an amount between $700 and $15,000 depending on the
sophistication of the software code.161 One security firm called Zeus
the “God of DIY [do-it-yourself] botnets” because of its ease-of-use,
wide availability, and simple functionality.162
In addition to the previously established legal bases for a lawsuit
against botnets, Microsoft alleged violations163 of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).164 The interstate
and international nature of the Internet was an unmistakable feature of
the defendant’s actions, and in furtherance of the criminal enterprise,
the defendants not only stole financial access information and withdrew
money from the victims’ bank accounts, they also hired a network of
“money mules” in the United States to move and store the stolen money
among fraudulent bank accounts.165
The court granted an ex parte TRO and seizure order directing the
US Marshall to seize evidence located in two US states; it also ordered
redirection of botnet traffic to a Microsoft site, transfer of unregistered
botnet names to Microsoft, disabling of IP addresses, and preservation
of evidence.166 The order to third parties was directed to registries and
others in the United States under the All Writs Act.167 ICANN, located

158. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 25.
159. Id. at 2–9.
160. Id. at 15.
161. Id.
162. See Doug Macdonald, Zeus: God of DIY Botnets, FORTIGUARD,
http://www.fortiguard.com/legacy/analysis/zeusanalysis.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015)
(providing a technical description of how a botnet is designed and operates).
163. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 35–37.
164. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (2006).
For an excellent discussion of RICO’s international reach, including the necessity to tackle
cybercrime through the use of this statute, see Gideon Mark, RICO’s Extraterritoriality, 50 AM.
BUS. L.J. 543, 583–85 (2013).
165. See Zeus Complaint, supra note 154, at 36.
166. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause
Re Prelim. Inj., Microsoft, Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Zeus TRO].
167. Id. at 10–11.
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in the United States, was directed to forward the Order to identified
foreign registries.168 The Preliminary Injunction more explicitly
provided for international cooperation, stating; “This Court
respectfully requests, but does not order, that foreign domain registries
and registrars take reasonable steps to work with Plaintiffs to ensure
that Defendants cannot use the Appendix A domains to control the
botnet.”169
The court added a provision in the order to compensate the
registries and associated entities for their actions to block the traffic
and preserve evidence, according to “prevailing rates for technical
assistance.”170 In addition, the court instructed that the orders be carried
out with the “least degree of interference with the normal operation” of
the Internet intermediaries as possible.171
It is noteworthy in the development of legal precedent that
Microsoft cited previous courts’ actions in Waledac, Rustock, and
Kelihos, in its proposition that; “The requested ex parte relief is not
uncommon when disabling dangerous botnets.”172 In contrast to the
proposition that legal actions to takedown botnets were becoming
standard operating procedure, a significant controversy over
Microsoft’s tactics erupted outside of the courtroom, in at least part of
the security community.173 When Microsoft took control of the
identified, compromised domain traffic, it affected some sites
maintained by security researchers who were watching and learning
from the Zeus operation, in the same way that Microsoft planned to do
with its court approved “sinkholing” of the websites.174 A security firm
in the Netherlands also claimed that Microsoft had used information
shared on a private security listserv, without permission from its
authors, and that its civil action had interfered with ongoing criminal

168. Id. at 11–12.
169. Order for Prelim. Inj. at 5, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012).
170. See Zeus TRO, supra note 166, at 14.
171. Id. at 9. The court also prohibited Microsoft from accessing the content of traffic that
was redirected to their servers, except for domain name identification. Id. at 10.
172. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application of for [sic] an Emergency Temporary
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause for Prelim. Inj. at 2, Microsoft Corp.
v. John Does 1–39, No. CV12-1335 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012).
173. See Michael Sandee, Critical Analysis of Microsoft Operation B71, FOX IT (Apr. 12,
2012), http://blog.fox-it.com/2012/04/12/critical-analysis-of-microsoft-operation-b71/.
174. Id.
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investigations.175 In response, Microsoft’s counsel explained the legal
necessity of keeping the number of people involved to a minimum in
order to obtain an ex parte order, and defended its “disruptive” strategy
as a beneficial supplement to criminal proceedings that were difficult
to pursue.176 The public debate about Microsoft’s legal strategy to
takedown Zeus illustrated a rift in the international security community
over the role and effectiveness of private civil actions.177
D. Nitol
In September 2012, Microsoft targeted the takedown of the Nitol
botnet that utilized an Internet domain from China.178 Through its
domain, 3322.org, the defendants hosted subdomains that comprised
the Nitol botnet, a botnet that produced spam and fraudulent emails,
and precipitated theft and other illegal activities; it was also capable of
a large scale [distributed] denial-of-service attack.179 The software was
extremely difficult to remove, and could log user keystrokes as well as
turn on the computer’s camera to observe the user.180 Interestingly,
Microsoft discovered the operation of the botnet by accident, when it
was testing the extent of unlicensed software sold in new computers in
China. After buying new computers for testing, it found that one of the
computers was infected with malware, right out of the box; as soon as
it was turned on it immediately connected to the Internet and
automatically started sending communications to the botnet command
and control for instructions.181
The Nitol botnet was especially damaging to users because it
spread by means of physical devices such as thumb drives, as well as
through Internet connections.182 Furthermore, it ran in the background
of computer processing, unknown to the user. Analysis of the 3322.org
domain found that it hosted a variety of malware, and allowed criminals

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See infra Part VI.
178. See Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. filed Sept.
10, 2012) [hereinafter Nitol Complaint].
179. Id. at 12, 19.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id. at 5–6.
182. Id. at 10.
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to avoid detection by using the 3322.org as the central place to direct
communications to other, changing, domain names.183
The complaint contained allegations of violations of the CFAA,
trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment, conversion, and negligence.184
Microsoft alleged that “the massive scale of the problem shows that
they [the defendants] are knowingly engaged in such [illegal botnet]
activity and/or negligently failing to take reasonable steps to deter such
activity.”185 The claim for negligence, similar to Kelihos, argued that
the contractual registration agreements obligated the defendants to take
reasonable care to avoid illegal actions, and that the breach of that duty
was the cause of damages to Microsoft.186 The court granted the ex
parte TRO and order that granted Microsoft control over the domain,
establishing a server for the purpose of forwarding the illegal traffic (a
sinkhole).187
The dispute was resolved without further court action, and a
release and settlement agreement entered into between Microsoft and
the defendants.188 The defendants agreed “to work in cooperation with
Microsoft and the National Computer Network Emergency Response
Technical Team Coordination Center of China”189 (China CERT) to
relaunch the domain, and to block the sub-domains identified as
belonging to the botnet (provided by Microsoft or the China CERT) by
redirecting them to a sinkhole maintained by MS or the China CERT
and by adopting a “publicly-published policy of zero tolerance for
illegal activities” on the domain.190 In consideration of those promises,
Microsoft agreed to return the control of the domains to the parties.191

183. Id. at 16.
184. Id. at 1.
185. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. Pen Yong,
No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012).
186. See Nitol Complaint, supra note 178, at 23.
187. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj.
at 5–6, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No. 1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012).
188. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Defendants Peng Yong; Changzhou Bei Te Kang
Mu Software Tech Co. Ltd; and John Does 1–3 at app. A, Microsoft Corp. v. Peng Yong, No.
1:12-CV-1004 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2012).
189. Id. at 1.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Non-Confidential Release and Settlement Agreement (Sept. 24, 2012) at 2–3 (on file
with the author).
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The Nitol botnet action was unique because of its genesis in the
supply chain. As the case developed, international cooperation by
Chinese authorities and Chinese CERT proved uniquely valuable for
settling the case and essential for an effective resolution. While some
security commentators questioned whether the settlement would be
effective, as criminals would simply move to another dynamic domain
name provider,192 the Nitol lawsuit aimed at a different level—
administration within the Internet infrastructure. While MS had control
of the domain, it identified 70,000 malicious subdomains operating in
connection with 500 strains of malicious software.193 MS operated a
sinkhole for 16 days, during which “it blocked more than 609 million
connections from more than 7,650,000 unique IP addresses.”194 Yet at
the same time, the domain facilitated almost 35 million valid
requests.195 Thus, the settlement is important not only as part of the
fight against criminal activity, but also as a lesson about the
responsibility of Internet intermediaries for overall security and safety.
E. Bamital
The primary purpose of the Bamital botnet was click fraud and
browser hijacking.196 Bamital malware enrolled a computer in the
botnet and ran without the user’s knowledge in the background,
clicking on ads in order to earn money per click, and redirecting user
search results to unintended websites and ads.197 The design of the
malicious software in a modular fashion meant that the botnet could

192. See Paul Ducklin, Microsoft Settles Lawsuit Against 3322 dot org, NAKEDSECURITY
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/10/05/microsoft-settles-lawsuit-against
-3322-dot-org/.
193. See Kelly Jackson Higgins, Microsoft Hands Off Nitol Botnet Sinkhole Operation To
Chinese CERT, INFORMATIONWEEK DARKREADING (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://
www.darkreading.com/end-user/microsoft-hands-off-nitol-botnet-sinkhol/240008324.
194. Id. “A botnet sinkhole is a target machine used by researchers to gather information
about a particular botnet. Sinkholing is the redirection of traffic from its original destination to
one specified by the sinkhole owners. The altered destination is known as the sinkhole.” See
Botnet Sinkhole, TECH TARGET (June 2014), http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/botnet
-sinkhole.
195. See Higgins, supra note 193.
196. See Complaint at 15, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va.
Jan. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Bamital Complaint].
197. Id. at 16.
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easily be used for other criminal and malicious purposes.198 The
motivation for taking down this particular botnet related, in part, to the
damage that click fraud presents to online advertising platforms, and
the Microsoft Bing search and ad business in particular. Bamital was
estimated to produce 3 million fraudulent clicks daily, costing
Microsoft millions of dollars of damage in lost revenue, as well as
incalculable damage to its reputation.199
In October, 2013, MS200 followed its previously established
framework for using the legal system to help takedown the Bamital
botnet, seeking an ex parte proceeding, third party orders, seizures of
physical evidence, and preliminary injunctions.201
As each botnet takedown was successfully pursued through legal
means, the cumulative nature of prior cases built stronger precedent for
the requested relief.202 The Bamital Preliminary Injunction ordered a
long list of registered domains in the botnet to be redirected to a server
controlled by Microsoft, and another long list of unregistered domains
to be directly transferred to Microsoft as the registrant.203 This allowed
Microsoft to take control of Bamital and to thwart its continued spread.
Third parties who were needed to assist in blocking the domains
included registries, registrars and subdomain hosting entities. Not only
were these third parties, such as VeriSign, located in the United States,
but they also included the National Internet Exchange in India, the
Public Interest Registry in charge of .org registrations, and
administrators/hosts of domains in South Korea, Czech Republic, and

198. See Bamital Bites the Dust, SYMANTEC CONNECT BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013, 7:09 PM),
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bamital-bites-dust. For further information about the
structure of Bamital, see PIOTR KRYSIUK & VIKRAM THAKUR, TROJAN.BAMITAL (2013).
199. See id. at 7.
200. Microsoft partnered with Symantec, whose security software update was affected by
the botnet. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft and Symantec Take Down Bamital
Botnet That Hijacks Online Searches, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013), http://
blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/02/06/microsoft-and-symantec-take-downbamital-botnet-that-hijacks-online-searches.aspx.
201. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corporation for an Emergency
Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order, and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 3–4,
Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. Jan. 13, 2013).
202. Id. at 3–5.
203. Prelim. Inj. at 7–8, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 13, 2013). Surrender of computers and evidence held by hosting companies was also ordered.
Id. at 9.
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the Netherlands.204 Bamital owners, first named as John Does, were
eventually identified as Marat Marynskij from either Lithuania or
Belarus, and Dmitry Chupkhim of Russia.205
Microsoft reported that by working with ICANN, registrars, and
international organizations it was able to block over 7,000 domains
from being registered for use in Bamital.206 MS acknowledged the
cooperation of the Indian CERT in the cleanup efforts, as they
facilitated the user notices so that cleanup tools could be made
available.207 In an important additional extension of the strategy to
remediate malicious botnets, Microsoft adopted a proactive cleanup
program for user computers; for the first time it notified users directly,
and provided tools for the user to uninstall the botnet software.208
As the above descriptions of the botnet civil cases indicate,
Microsoft did not act solely on its own. There was an evolution,
however, in the most recent botnet actions, as coordinated, cooperative
efforts with law enforcement were featured as a new method for
tackling cybercrimes instigated by botnets.
IV. COLLABORATIVE TAKEDOWNS
The Citadel and ZeroAccess botnet actions were distinct from the
first five actions led by Microsoft, not because of the legal arguments
or basis for the civil lawsuit, but because of the extensive coordination
in pursuing the botnet operators. Microsoft called its Citadel case in
June 2013, its “most aggressive botnet operation to date,”209 as it
included collaboration with the FBI, financial services entities, and the
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The FBI

204. Complaint at 6–7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No. 1:13-CV-139 (Jan. 31,
2013).
205. Amended Complaint at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. Maznskij, No. 1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va.
June 17, 2013).
206. Microsoft Corporation’s Status Report at 2, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–18, No.
1:13-CV-139 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2013).
207. Richard Domingues Boscovich, Bamital Botnet Takedown is Successful; Cleanup
Underway, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Feb. 22, 2013) http://blogs.technet.com/b/Microsoft
_blog/archive/2013/02/22/bamital-botnet-takedown-is-successful-clean-up-underway.aspx.
208. Id.
209. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft Works With Financial Services Industry
Leaders, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (June 5, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog
/archive/2013/06/05/microsoft-works-with-financial-services-industry-leaders-law-enforcement
-and-others-to-disrupt-massive-financial-cybercrime-ring.aspx.
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acted separately, but in coordination with, the civil action.210 In
addition, the FBI provided communication with foreign law
enforcement agencies in order to encourage voluntary worldwide
action against the botnet.211 The FBI touted the collaborative nature of
the pursuit of Citadel, stating that:
Creating successful public-private relationships—in which tools,
knowledge, and intelligence are shared—is the ultimate key to
success in addressing cyber threats and is among the highest
priorities of the FBI. We must ensure that, as cyber policy is
developed, the ability of the private sector to coordinate in real time
with the FBI is encouraged so that a multi-prong attack on our cyber
adversaries can be as effective as possible.212

In the second coordinated effort, undertaken at the end of 2013,
the collaboration extended across the globe, including European
country law enforcement, Europol, and industry partners, among
others.213 These two cases arguably represent the current best practice
of cyberdefense against botnets, the culmination of an evolution in
legal strategy involving civil and criminal actions.
A. Citadel
In June 2013, Microsoft’s coordinated action tackled the Citadel
family of botnets, dismantling over 1,400 unique botnets.214 As the FBI
explained the timeline of events, “Microsoft exercised its independent
civil authorities in this matter. The company then coordinated with the
FBI and other private parties.”215 The Citadel botnet stole online
banking passwords by employing techniques similar to the Zeus
botnet.216 Also similarly, the creator of the software sold it
prepackaged, in “builder kits” for an approximate price of $2,400.217
210. FBI Statement on Botnet Operation, FBI NEWS BLOG (June 5, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/news_blog/botnets-101/fbi-statement-on-botnet-operation.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Richard Domingues Boscovich, Microsoft, Europol, FBI and Industry Partners
Disrupt Notorious ZeroAccess Botnet That Hijacks Search Results, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12/05/microsoft-europol
-fbi-and-industry-partners-disrupt-notorious-zeroaccess-botnet-that-hijacks-search-results.aspx.
214. Id.
215. FBI Statement on Botnet Operation, supra note 210.
216. Complaint at 7, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D.N.C. May
29, 2013) [hereinafter Citadel Complaint].
217. Id. at 8.
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The perpetrators of the Citadel botnet were organized in a “single
global criminal operation”218 that managed distribution chains, offered
customer services, and sought continual improvement;219 functions
eerily like those of management practices in mainstream organizations.
Among other allegations, the RICO charges220 seemed particularly well
suited to the facts.
Two to five million computers were estimated to be infected with
the Citadel malware, and the losses from the theft of money from bank
accounts was called “staggering.”221 The “particularly sophisticated
and destructive botnet enterprise”222 illustrated that botnet operators
could evolve in reaction to defensive actions that sought to disable its
reach. Bots checked for instructions every 20 minutes and the botnet
controllers could update bots “almost instantaneously.”223 The users’
computers in a Citadel botnet were continuously monitored for online
banking operations, and whenever the opportunity arose, the malware
would steal passwords, account logins, and customer access
information.224 In addition, the malware blocked automated security
updates on the user’s computer, and prevented the user from manually
accessing security websites; the result was an impossible situation for
infected users who could not disentangle themselves from the claws of
the botnet.225
As in past botnet operations, except perhaps with more detailed
instructions, Microsoft received an ex parte TRO that allowed it to,
with orders to third party Internet entities for implementation, take
control of currently registered harmful domains and operate them in
place of the botnet controller, warehouse unregistered harmful
domains, and seize servers and other evidence.226 Beyond these now
well-established procedures, Microsoft took the proactive step of

218. Id. at 7.
219. See id. at 8–11.
220. See id. at 12–14.
221. Brief in Support of Microsoft’s Ex Parte Application for an Emergency Temporary
Restraining Order, Seizure Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 1, Microsoft Corp.
v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D.N.C. May 29, 2013).
222. Id. at 2.
223. See Citadel Complaint, supra note 216, at 22.
224. Id. at 7.
225. Id. at 22.
226. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj.
at 11–17, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–82, No. 3:13-CV-319 (W.D. N.C. May 29, 2013).
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obtaining the right for a Microsoft server to send instructions to bots
that would “stop the harmful acts of the Citadel botnet malicious
software,” allow the computer to connect to security anti-virus
websites, and direct the bot to a substituted the Microsoft server.227
After two weeks, Microsoft could implement step two for those
computers that continued to be infected with the Citadel malware;
when an infected user accessed a browser, it was locked into a curativenotice website for twenty minutes where the only thing that the user
could do was stay on that site or go to an anti-virus website.228 In the
case of an obstinate user, step three allowed Microsoft to run the
curative website on the user’s computer for “up to one twenty minute
period every five hours for one twenty-four period once per week, until
such time as Microsoft deems it on longer necessary to prompt the
owners of such infected end-user computers to take the steps necessary
to cleanse them of the Citadel botnet infection.”229 The legal basis for
the court order was that the actions were “consistent with the terms of
Microsoft’s license to its Windows operating system.”230
The Citadel remediation action was reminiscent of the Coreflood
botnet order that substituted a DoJ server for the command server and
allowed the FBI to send a notice to infected users that would also
uninstall the malware on an individual’s computers with express
consent. The Microsoft remediation went further; it modified
admittedly malicious code on a user’s computer without explicit
consent and interfered for a short, yet increasingly intrusive, time with
the user’s access to the Internet. The remediation efforts generally
brought praise,231 however, like the Coreflood operation, it was not
without its critics. A segment of the security community decried that
Microsoft had included security domain names among the group of
harmful names it sinkholed, and questioned Microsoft’s methodology

227. Id. at 20.
228. Id. at 20–21.
229. Id. at 21.
230. Id. at 19. The court order did not explain further; presumably the reference was to the
authority under the license to install updates.
231. See, e.g., Paul Ducklin, FBI and Microsoft in Massive Takedown of Citadel Botnets,
NAKEDSECURITY (June 6, 2013), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/06/06/fbi-and-microsoft
-in-massive-takedown-of-citadel-crimeware/.
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of inserting a “stop” command into the malware on a user’s
computer.232 As explained:
Microsoft ensures that once a bot connects to their sinkhole it stays
there and won’t try to reach out to a different C&C. In theory, this
is a very good idea and I have to say that many sinkhole operators
had the same thought years ago. But unlike Microsoft, most of the
sinkhole operators came to a different conclusion: Sending out valid
configuration files de facto changes settings of a computer without
the consent or knowledge of the user (computer owner). In most
countries, this is violating local law.233

The weak point in this criticism is that Microsoft did not act
unilaterally as the security researcher implies; it obtained prior court
approval. It respected the rule of law, was not taking part in unilateral
offensive action, and followed established legal procedures. In sum:
The act of writing up a complaint, backing it up with declarations in
support of the plaintiff's motions, and having a federal judge review
and grant plaintiff's motions is a very clear, very thorough, and very
public justification for taking bold action. This process explains of
[sic] who is being harmed, how they are being harmed, what can be
done to stop the harm, and why the court should grant the plaintiff's
motions.234

B. ZeroAccess
The ZeroAccess botnet engaged in click fraud, identity theft, and
DoS attacks.235 Although click fraud might seem to be one of the least
harmful actions that a botnet can take, it significantly damages business
models for online advertising; criminals can steal millions of dollars a
year in this manner.236 Online advertising amounted to $20.1 billion in
the first half of 2013 alone, based in large part on payment for clicks
on ads that were delivered, among others, by Microsoft’s Bing search

232. See Collateral Damage: Microsoft Hits Security Researchers Along With Citadel,
SWISS SEC. BLOG (June 7, 2013), http://www.abuse.ch/?p=5362.
233. Id. No examples were given of what specific laws might be violated. For a study of the
legal issues involved from a European Union viewpoint, see VIHUL ET AL., supra note 8, at 8–16.
234. David Dittrich, Thoughts on the Microsoft’s “Operation b71” (Zeus Botnet Civil Legal
Action), HONEYNET PROJECT (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:56 AM), http://www.honeynet.org/node/830.
235. Complaint at 13, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter ZeroAccess Complaint].
236. Id. at 9.
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engine.237 The ZeroAccess botnet hijacked browsers on infected
computers to click on ads and fraudulently collect payment for the
clicks while uninstalling and blocking security upgrades.238 In addition,
ZeroAccess also interacted with Zeus purveyors from the former botnet
so that it was surmised that the Zeus controllers were attempting to
restart their botnet by piggybacking on ZeroAccess infections. 239
ZeroAccess utilized eighteen servers located in Latvia,
Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany.240 Taking
down this botnet in November 2013, therefore required global
cooperation between public and private entities. While Microsoft was
able to file suit in a civil action in Texas due to tens of thousands of
compromised computers there,241 the international reach of the botnet
required a coordinated effort with the FBI, Europol’s European
Cybercrime Centre, and industry partners.242
The ZeroAccess botnet architecture differed from some of the
previous botnets, as it operated by means of a P2P system whereby each
bot communicated directly with other bots in order to update the
malware and pass on instructions.243 Each time a bot connected with
another bot it asked for instructions and updates; in that way the viral
communications reduced the necessity of continual communication
with a central C&C server. Peers did contain a list of IP addresses that
changed regularly, which provided further instructions to implement
click fraud. In addition, a larger number of domain names were
provided as backup locations for instructions should the IP addresses,
located with static servers internationally, fail to respond.244 By not
237. Id. at 8–9.
238. Id. at 15–16. In addition, ZeroAccess ran silently on a user’s computer. Except perhaps
for a slowdown in processing, the user would have no idea that the malware was running in the
background while he was using the computer for other functions. Id. at 15.
239. See Brief in Support of Application of Microsoft Corp. for an Emergency Ex Parte
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj. at 15, Microsoft Corp. v.
John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter ZeroAccess Brief]
(“In spite of these concerted efforts and successes [botnet civil actions] branches of the Zeus
botnet live on, and the operators of Zeus are evidently using ZeroAccess-generated traffic to infect
more computer in an attempt to rebuild their criminal enterprise.”).
240. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Re Prelim. Inj.
at 4–5, Microsoft Corp. v. John Does 1–8, No. A13-CV-1014SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013)
[hereinafter ZeroAccess TRO].
241. Id.
242. Boscovich, supra note 213.
243. See ZeroAccess Complaint, supra note 235, at 12.
244. Id. at 14.
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employing a C&C infrastructure alone, the ZeroAccess botnet was
much more difficult to disarm; as Microsoft explained; “Due to its
network architecture, ZeroAccess is one of the most robust and durable
botnets on the Internet today.”245 A layered strategy was necessary for
an effective takedown. The IP addresses were all maintained on servers
outside the United States, therefore the court could only request, not
order, that the hosting entities block access and cut off service.246 In
this aspect of the fight against ZeroAccess, the global collaboration
with law enforcement agencies and other private parties was key.
Secondly, the court ordered domain registries in the United States to
redirect active botnet traffic (sinkhole) to Microsoft substitute servers,
and to transfer any inactive botnet domain name to Microsoft.247 The
third part of the court order, and a new approach, directed forty-five
ISPs in the United States to implement a block on traffic emanating
from or directed to the botnet IP addresses.248 ISPs operate at different
levels; they are both the “on-ramp,” or user-connection point, and they
route Internet traffic from sender-to-destination.249 ISPs voluntarily
undertake website blocking from time-to-time, for example when they
implement blacklists of websites that are known to send spam.250
When the botnet owners attempted to occupy and use substitute
IP addresses and avoid a shutdown, Microsoft coordinated with its
partners; “Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) took
immediate action to coordinate with member country law enforcement
agencies, led by Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt’s (BKA) Cyber
Intelligence Unit, to quickly track down those new fraud IP
addresses.”251 The botnet operators, evidently digitally surrendering,
sent a final message to the infected computers simply stating “White
Flag.”252

245. Id.
246. See ZeroAccess TRO, supra note 240, at 10.
247. Id. at 11–12.
248. Id. at 8–9.
249. See OLIVER HECKMANN, THE COMPETITIVE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER 13 (David
Hutchison ed., 2006).
250. See About Spamhaus, SPAMHAUS PROJECT, http://www.spamhaus.org/organization/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (describing the organization, its blacklist of spam sites, and the use by
ISPs).
251. Richard Domingues Boscovich, ZeroAccess Criminals Wave White Flag, OFFICIAL
MICROSOFT BLOG (Dec. 19, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_blog/archive/2013/12
/19/zeroaccess-criminals-wave-white-flag-the-impact-of-partnerships-on-cybercrime.aspx.
252. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic, and thorny problem. As
proven by the botnet takedown cases, private entities can proactively
use the civil legal system to lead and contribute to cybersafety. One of
the goals of this article is to document Microsoft’s legal strategy over
the course of eight botnet takedowns so that it can be considered for
future action by other private entities. Microsoft’s civil suits against
botnets used legal tools in an innovative way to tackle an intractable
and thorny global problem. The legal approach reduced botnet activity,
provided a valuable service to users with infected computers, and more
broadly increased the level of cybersecurity. Regardless, the wisdom
of private civil action is not unanimously praised; as one security expert
stated: “The problem with cybercrime is that it can’t be solved with
doing takedowns. It’s only possible to solve this issue by implementing
legislation related to cybercrime, enforce them [sic] by getting bad
actors arrested and implementing security by design on different
layers.”253 Some believe that Microsoft has stepped outside the bounds
of its position as a private party,254 and that it is the role of legislatures
and law enforcement to pursue criminals. In contrast, Microsoft
proposes that civil lawsuits could be used by many private entities; the
resulting increased cost of operating botnets would exert economic
pressure on operators and thereby reduce the number of botnets due to
those increased costs.255
The private sector’s role in cybersecurity, and specifically the
proactive legal role, deserves detailed analysis. The complex problems
of public and private roles, jurisdictional boundaries, international
cooperation, limited resources, and the technical sophistication of
cyberattacks, will require further research. The outline of the
Microsoft’s legal suits against botnets provides a springboard for
further analysis. To begin this analysis, the following discussion
suggests four lenses for future research into understanding the wider
impact of the takedowns: crimtorts, governance theory, strategic
253. Zeljka Zorz, Microsoft Citadel Takedown Ultimately Counterproductive, HELP NET
SECURITY (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?id=2514 (result of
takedowns is temporary).
254. See Collateral Damage, supra note 232; see also supra text accompanying note 233.
The comments and reactions of security researchers to the interview with Richard Boscovich from
Microsoft regarding the Zeus takedown were conflicting, and the topic of Microsoft, law
enforcement, and the security industry roles was controversial. See Brian Krebs, Microsoft
Responds to Critics Over Botnet Bruhaha, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:49 PM),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/04/microsoft-responds-to-critics-over-botnet-bruhaha/.
255. Id.
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management, and international lenses. Each of these lenses provokes
both unique questions and support for the sustainability of civil actions
for cybersecurity.
A. Crimtorts Lens
Viewed broadly, the question regarding Microsoft’s botnet
takedown actions is whether the use of criminal law by means of law
enforcement should be the authoritative vehicle for stopping
cybercrime, and concurrently, what role if any the private sector should
play. Rustad was one of the first scholars to promote a place for private
enforcement actions against cybercrime in 2001, arguing that criminal
law is “an inadequate institution of social control against
cybercrime”256 because of cybercrime’s global reach, the lack of law
enforcement resources, and constraints imposed by protecting civil
liberties in the electronic environment,257 reasons that persist today.258
Rustad argues for a cast of private attorneys general, serving the public
interest through private lawsuits that apply established tort law to new
situations in cyberspace, punishing the wrongdoer by means of punitive
damages rather than criminal penalties.259 Rustad and his co-author
Koenig previously developed the theory of the use of tort law to
accomplish wider social benefits under the term “crimtort.”260 More
recently, crimtort actions were described as “[c]ivil actions that
concurrently fulfill the private function of compensating injured

256. See Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier,
11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 67 (2001).
257. See id. at 96–100.
258. See Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity: Ideas Whose Time Has Not Come—And
Shouldn’t, 8 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 408, 418–19 (2012) (arguing that government
should work with the private sector rather than directly alter/impact Internet traffic).
259. See Rustad, supra note 256, at 104–06. One could argue that early cases against spam
and trespass to chattels, and the ebay v. Bidders Edge case, would fall into the paradigm of a
private attorney general; however, the public interest in those cases is not featured as it was in the
botnet documents, and the effect of the actions was more localized and plaintiff-specific than the
promotion of overall Internet and consumer safety as was the issue in the botnet cases. For a
discussion of these earlier cases and tort law, see Guzman, supra note 97, at 534–38; see also
Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 484 (“Tort law not only bridges
a regulatory gap, but it also bridges the hiatus left by criminal law that lags well behind
technological and social changes, such as Internet-related wrongdoing.” (citations omitted)).
260. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” As Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 (1998).
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claimants while serving the broader public purpose of controlling
socially harmful behavior. . . .”261
Microsoft’s botnet enforcement actions are similar to the private
attorney general role envisioned by Rustad. In order for it to gain the
extraordinary ex parte action without notice, and a preliminary
injunction, Microsoft relied on the positive public interest served by its
actions, and in contrast, the irreparable harm that would be suffered
should the request not be granted.262 The briefs and court filings are, in
fact, replete with references to the specific harms that individuals incur
as a result of the botnet operations, from stolen funds, decreased
computer functionality, to disabled security and future vulnerability.
Undoubtedly, Microsoft’s legal actions have benefitted the general
public.
Microsoft pursued cybercriminals in the private attorney model,
however there are distinctions between the modern pursuit of botnets
and the previously envisioned private attorney general function. The
concept of a private attorney general anticipates a consumer or
environmental champion role, resulting in lawsuits against powerful
corporations or institutions,263 supplementing the effectiveness of but
not supplanting government enforcement.264 Although Microsoft cases
evolved to include more explicit prior coordination with law
enforcement, the cases turn the concept of the role of the large
corporation around. Rather than the target of a private action to coerce
publically beneficial behavior, the large corporation, Microsoft, was
the leader of lawsuits to protect the public and to promote cybersecurity
and safety.
Another difference between traditionally conceived tort remedies
that promote the public good and the botnet cases is that Microsoft has
evidently not been able to obtain damages from any of the defendants,
most of who remain at large and many who remain unidentified.
Therefore, cybercriminals will not be deterred by the imposition of
either compensatory or punitive damages; a predicate to the theory of
261. Thomas H. Koenig, Crimtorts: A Cure for Hardening of the Categories, 17 WIDENER
L.J. 733, 733 (2008).
262. See, e.g., ZeroAccess Brief, supra note 239, at 23, 31.
263. See generally Nicholas DiMascio, Credit Where Credit is Due: The Legal Treatment
of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J. 1587 (2007) (discussing impact of
private nuisance suits brought against corporations).
264. See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L. J. 419, 490–91 (2012)
(discussing application of theory to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
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the effectiveness of the private attorney general. Microsoft’s strategy
to create an economic disincentive to wrongdoers by means of botnet
disruptions may substitute in part for damages, but these economic
damages are indirect and more difficult effect to measure. The crimtort
or private attorney general theory may fit in the case of private civil
actions against cybercrime, however further examination of the effect
on cybercriminals is necessary. In addition, Microsoft has an inherent
motivation to pursue civil actions against botnet operators who damage
their reputation and harm their business model. Finding private entities
that have as high a stake in the game as Microsoft will be difficult,265
and the expansion of the private attorney general approach will depend
upon attracting private parties who have the incentive to act similarly.
B. Governance Theory Lens
Traditional regulatory, governance theory assumes a top down
and centralized system of laws and governmental implementation of
those rules of behavior for society,266 assumptions that are not reflected
in Microsoft’s leadership of the botnet takedowns. Yet cybercrime in
general, and botnet crimes in particular, belong to an ecosystem that is
difficult to govern and police, both technically and legally. Traditional
governance theory may be insufficient to address the new environment.
Polycentric governance theory may provide a more appropriate
lens through which to view cybersecurity actions.267 The theory
265. Facebook cooperated with the FBI to takedown a botnet that spread through its users,
providing users with software to uninstall the malware. However, Facebook did not file a civil
suit or otherwise lead the effort in the way that Microsoft did. See Facebook and the FBI Partner
to Take Botnet Offline, FACEBOOK SECURITY (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:05 PM), https://
www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/facebook-and-the-fbi-partner-to-take-botnet-offline
/10151134554125766.
266. See Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through
Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 411 (2012). Scholars have distinguished
between the traditional modes of government regulation and broader governance, as explained in
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete
Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 274 (2009).
However, the terms are used more generally in this article.
267. Other governance theories include new governance and deliberative democracy; a
detailed discussion of different governance theories across disciplines is beyond the scope of this
article. For a good overview of the theories, see Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A
Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008). Compare Orly
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (“The new governance model connotes a
decentering of legal scholarship, challenging the traditional focus on formal regulation as the
dominant locus of change.”), with Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought
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assumes the devolution of complete state power and governance amid
increased governance participation by non-state entities, a movement
toward multiple sources of governance, and increased local power.268
Some scholars cite global Internet governance as an example of this
new type of governance.269 Shackelford uses the lens of polycentric
governance to propose a framework for cybersecurity that is
approached most successfully by a multi-layered, multi-player,
coordinated response.270 The actions by Microsoft, its interactions with
security firms and researchers, and its collaborations with law
enforcement, deserve further study as they relate to polycentric
governance and other governance theories. Microsoft may be able to
play a role that focuses on the safety of the Internet without the need
for more exacting criminal proof and criminal arrests. Attribution is a
thorny problem271 for bringing criminal charges, and private rather than
criminal actions could be more effective. As is explained:
Attribution, however, may be more important for government and
law enforcement than for private sector organizations. Law
enforcement, through their investigations, may strive for attribution
so that the actual perpetrator may be prosecuted. Industry
organizations, however, may be less concerned and may focus more
on damage control and prevention—regardless of the actor or his
motivations.272

In addition, private sector leadership to secure the Internet,
especially when access to individual computers is required, can avoid
the stigma and limitation of government access. The federal
government’s Conficker remediation drew criticism even though the
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471
(2004) (asserting a reply to Lobel, taking issue with the consolidation of scholarship).
268. See Burris, supra note 267, at 15–19. See also KRISTIN M. FINKLEA & CATHERINE A.
THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42547, CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR
CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (2012).
269. See Burris, supra note 267, at 23. Additionally, Froomkin proposes that Internet
standard adoption procedures could meet the deliberative discourse theory of Habermas. See A.
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116
HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).
270. Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks Through
Polycentric Governance, 62 Am. U. L. Rev. 1273, 1352–60 (2013).
271. For a complete view of attribution from cybercrime to military action, see Duncan B.
Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 391–406 (2011). For a discussion of
the issue of attribution for cyberwarfare, see Collin S. Allan, Attribution Issues in Cyberspace, 13
CHI. KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55 (2013).
272. FINKLEA & THEOHARY, supra note 268, at 11.
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court ordered the FBI not to access any files on computers that were
freed from the botnet. More recently, National Security Agency
surveillance has likely heightened concerns for government access to
personal commuters, even though the circumstances are quite different;
privacy from government intrusion is now a hotly contended issue.
Whether individuals would trust the government or private entities
more to respect their privacy while securing computers from
cyberthreats deserves further scrutiny.273
More broadly, and related to the polycentric approach, the report
of the Conficker virus workgroup showed that local and grassroots
actions in the horizontal environment of cybersecurity inherently result
in problems with trust, exacerbated by the extremely decentralized
governance model.274 Perhaps Microsoft’s leadership was a
prerequisite for an effective governance paradigm, although
communications between those with security information will always
be essential. Microsoft is evidently ready to assume this role, as in 2013
it created the Digital Crimes Unit and the Cybercrime Center, staffed
by technical and legal experts, dedicated to tackling cybercrime.275
Likewise, changing approaches to the botnet takedowns from a solely
privately led civil suit, to the Citadel and ZeroAccess collaborations
with law enforcement around the world, provide evidence that the
governance of cybersecurity and the pursuit of cybercriminals have
evolved towards an increasingly networked governance framework.
Furthermore, in February of 2014 Microsoft announced that it signed
Memorandums of Agreement with the Organization of American
States, Europol, and FIS (banking and payment systems) that “establish
a framework for collaboration . . . intended to spur collaboration”276 to
pursue cybercriminals.

273. In a recent survey, respondents did not trust large companies to protect their privacy in
general; however, they trusted the NSA even less. See Jaikumar Vijayan, Snowden Leaks Erode
Trust in Internet Companies, Government, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 4, 2014, 8:23 AM PT), http://
www.computerworld.com/s/article/9247441/Snowden_leaks_erode_trust_in_Internet_companie
s_government.
274. See infra II.B.
275. See Microsoft Unveils State-of-the-Art Cybercrime Center, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER
(Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2013/nov13/11-14cybercrime
centerpr.aspx.
276. See Microsoft Enters Into New Global Partnerships in Fight Against Cybercrime,
MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER (Feb. 12, 2014), http://news.microsoft.com/2014/02/12/microsoft
-enters-into-new-global-partnerships-in-fight-against-cybercrime.
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C. Strategic Management Lens
A broad definition of the strategic management of a firm is that it
is a process by which a strategic plan is adopted, implemented, and
revised in order to maintain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace.277 In this process, a company will not only identify its
strategic strengths but it will seek to minimize its risks, or
weaknesses.278 Considering Microsoft’s actions from a strategic
management viewpoint, it makes sense for it to participate in, and it
could be strategically astute for it to assume leadership of, efforts to
combat the botnet plague. Botnets harm Microsoft’s reputation by
counterfeiting and mimicking its products, weakening its advertising
business model through clickfraud, and creating a lack of trust in the
safety of the Internet. Microsoft’s competiveness could be hurt as a
result.
Microsoft has never denied that its actions were not internally
beneficial or proposed that there were no economic motives for its
actions. With regards to its civil actions to dismantle botnets, a
Microsoft lawyer, Richard Boscovich, explained, “We’re not a
charitable corporation, obviously. But there are some times when it
makes good business sense to actually do good in the community as
well. It’s one for those intersections where business and being a good
corporate citizen actually complements each other.”279 Thus, one could
seek to understand Microsoft’s actions from a business, strategic
management, perspective.
Porter and Kramer’s work in “creating shared value”280 for
business and society alike may prove relevant to the analysis. Shared
value is conceptualized as distinct from corporate responsibility or
philanthropy, as it “recognizes that societal needs, not just conventional
economic needs, define markets.”281 A purely economic corporate
perspective, on the other hand, leaves societal interests outside of the
strategic box, as consumers are viewed only as a source of profit and
“societal problems [as] . . . economic costs in the firm’s value chain.”282
In comparison, the shared value approach promoted by Porter and

277. See Nedelle Grossman, The Duty to Think Strategically, 73 LA. L. REV. 449, 455–473
(2013) (relating strategy to the management of risk as well).
278. Id. at 459–61.
279. See Krebs, supra note 254.
280. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan–Feb. 2011, at 62.
281. Id. at 65.
282. Id. at 68.
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Kramer encourages firms to consider societal needs as an integral part
of their corporate strategy and as a vehicle for growth. As a general
example, the provision of cybersecurity products to consumers would
benefit the firm by the sales of its products, but would benefit both the
consumer and the firm by reducing the risks of online activities and
contributing to safety in cyberspace. Furthermore, if the cybersecurity
firm also engaged in education about cyber-secure practices, then both
the firm and the consumer would share in the value of the cybersafety
efforts; the firm may also benefit from a new market for cyberproducts
as a result of the consumer awareness.
The Boscovich quote parallels the principle of shared value in
some respect; both Microsoft and society in general have a common
interest in reducing cybercrime, particularly crime facilitated by
botnets. Few companies explicitly adopt the shared value approach,
however, and while the societal and business benefit is evident in the
pursuit of cybersecurity, it is unclear if Microsoft has reconceived its
relationship in this way. Understanding Microsoft’s actions, its
relationship to corporate responsibility, shared value, and the relevance
of its legal strategies for overall strategic management will require
additional analysis as its botnet remediation continues to evolve.283
D. International Lens
International dimensions have been discussed in the concepts of
polycentric governance and strategic management284 and in the way in
which nations across the globe have cooperated with Microsoft to
voluntarily dismantle botnet structures.285 The international questions
deserve further analysis as relates to Microsoft’s legal strategy and the
role of private entities in cybersecurity.
The significant extent of cooperation by foreign courts and foreign
law enforcement with Microsoft and US court requests correlates with
the magnitude of the problem and the difficulty of resolution. While
not impossible, it is difficult and time consuming for law enforcement
to follow criminals across international boundaries. Criminals who
283. The use of law for strategic management purposes has been addressed by Constance E.
Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008);
Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2008); George J. Siedel
& Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641 (2010).
284. See discussions infra Parts VI.B–C.
285. For example, China’s CERT cooperated in the Nitol case and the ZeroAccess case
involved several countries’ law enforcement agencies. See discussion infra Parts IV.D., V.B.
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prey on individual consumers in foreign countries are particularly
unlikely to be arrested, or followed, across international jurisdictional
boundaries.286 The resources and expertise are simply not available to
the local entities who otherwise would be the ones most appropriately
protecting the public.287 U.S. courts also recognize their jurisdictional
limitations; the Microsoft injunctions and orders included deferential
requests for foreign cooperation to stop the spread of harmful
botnets.288 International criminal coordination between law
enforcement could be viewed through a different lens, especially in the
current environment of suspicion raised by National Security Agency
surveillance.289
Whether Microsoft can continue its aggressive actions against
cybercrime could depend on the international evolution of Internet
governance, a complex issue with many different sides.290 On March
14, 2014, the United States indicated that it would transfer to ICANN
the U.S. Commerce Department/National Telecommunications and
Information Administration’s role in the functioning of the domain
name system.291 Public debate intensified around the announcement,
and future developments are uncertain.292 As the botnet cases show,
Microsoft’s strategy depends in part on the location of ICANN in the
United States as a California incorporated entity. U.S. courts can exert
jurisdiction and order ICANN to take measures to block and transfer
domain names and IP addresses that are used for criminal purposes. If
the Internet infrastructure changes more broadly so that major
286. See Danny Yadron, Grappling With Cybercrime, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2014, at A3.
287. Id.
288. For example, see the discussion of the Nitol case infra Part IV.D.
289. See Tom Brewster, Has the NSA’s Mass Spying Made Life Easier for Digital
Criminals?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2014, 7:37 AM EST), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2014/mar/07/nsa-spying-harmed-digital-crime-fight.
290. For a concise historical background to some of the changes in governance, see Jonathan
Weinberg, Governments, Privatization, and “Privatization”: ICANN and the GAC, 18 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 189 (2011).
291. See Press Release, Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., NTIA Announces Intent to
Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions (Mar. 14, 2014), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-nam
e-functions; see also Loretta Chao et al., U.S. Hopes to Soothe Cyberspying Tensions as Web
Summit Looms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2014, at B3 (reporting that international distrust based on
NSA surveillance led to a U.S. proposal to transfer control of Internet addressing).
292. See, e.g., Denver Nicks, Republicans Don’t Want America to Give Up Control of Web
Addresses, TIME (Apr. 10, 2014), http://time.com/58277/republicans-dont-want-america-to-give
-up-control-of-web-addresses/.

08_ARTICLE_HILLER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/27/2015 1:51 PM

CIVIL CYBER CONFLICT

213

structural entities, such as ICANN or VeriSign, are not located in the
United States then Microsoft will effectively lose its legal strategy to
dismantle botnets.293 The relationship between ICANN, the United
States, and the international community will continue to evolve; the
Microsoft botnet cases illustrate one reason why Internet governance
and infrastructure decisions are important to the future of
cybersecurity.
CONCLUSION
This article contributes to an understanding of the role of the
private sector in cybersecurity by chronicling civil lawsuits brought by
Microsoft to takedown botnets, and by comparing the evolution of
these takedowns to two different efforts, by law enforcement and an
informal security group. The botnet takedowns by Microsoft have been
subject to both praise and criticism, and some charged that Microsoft
has acted as a “vigilante.”294 Microsoft’s efforts have evolved,
however, to be significantly integrated with law enforcement efforts,
as the most recent Citadel and ZeroAccess lawsuits illustrate. Microsoft
heralded its Citadel operation as a success, and as the emergence of a
new framework, describing the action as “a real world example of how
public-private cooperation can work effectively within the judicial
system, and how 20th-century legal precedent and common law
principles dating back hundreds of years can be effectively applied
toward 21st-century cybersecurity issues.”295 The FBI also recognizes
the heightened importance of public private partnerships and
international coordination. 296
“Going it alone,” as Microsoft did in the series of cases before the
Citadel and ZeroAccess botnet takedowns, has its risks. In takedown
efforts occurring after this article was in production, Microsoft
obtained an ex parte order allowing it to take control of 22 domains of

293. See supra note 153 and accompanying text describing the relationship of registries and
domain names, and how this relates to the takedown of botnets.
294. See Dittrich, supra note 234; John Leyden, Microsoft Botnet Smackdown ‘Caused
Collateral Damage, Failed to Kill Target,’ THE REGISTER (June 13, 2013, 12:59 PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/06/13/ms_citadel_takedown_analysis.
295. See Boscovich, supra note 209.
296. See Richard P. Quinn, Nat’l Sec. Assistant Special Agent In Charge, FBI, Statement
Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on CyberSecurity, Infrastructure
Protection,
and
Security
Technologies
(Apr.
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbis-role-in-cyber-security.
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No-IP, based on evidence that subdomains were involved in botnet
activity. Microsoft was unable, however, to handle the traffic of
innocent users, and reportedly blocked 5 million valid users.297 Days
later, Microsoft and Vitalwerks, the parent of No-IP, announced that
the domains had been restored and the dispute was settled.298 Criticism
of Microsoft’s failure ensued, tempered by praise for the results of the
takedown, and spurring debate about private entities’ proper role in
addressing cybercrime.299
In the ultra-connected, electronically dependent world, botnets
threaten the security of countries, people, and industries, because they
are the vehicle for criminals, and potentially nation states, to disrupt
society, harm privacy, commit fraud and theft, and seed distrust of the
marketplace and Internet communications. Because of their
commodification, botnets are easy to launch, and proliferate easily. Yet
botnet defensive technology continues to strengthen, making them
difficult to defeat through only technical counter measures. The
evolution of a combination of technical methods, international
collaborations, and legal strategies to defeat botnets shows promise for
success. The active leadership of the private sector, using the legal
system, will certainly be a component of future cybersecurity
frameworks; understanding the dynamics and coordination of these
relationships, and the limits of the applicable laws, will deserve future
examination. For the present, the addition of a civil legal strategy to
disrupt botnets to the many technical efforts by public and private
parties to do the same strengthens cybersecurity and is becoming a
powerful tool to fight cybercrime globally.

297. Nate Cardozo, What Were They Thinking? Microsoft Seizes, Returns Majority of NoIP.com’s Business, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (July 10, 2014), http://www.eff.org
/deeplinks/2014/07/microsoft-and-noip-what-were-they-thinking.
298. Natalie Goguen, Vitalwerks and Microsoft Reach Settlement, NO-IP.COM (July 9,
2014), http://www.noip.com/blog/2014/07/09/vitalwerks-microsoft-reach-settlement.
299. Tim Ring, MS No-IP Takedown Hits 25% of APT Attackers, SC MAGAZINE UK
(July 2, 2014), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/ms-no-ip-takedown-hits-25-of-apt-attackers
/article/359021.

